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case of 1945. Each of the opinions of the Justices offers a distinct interpretation
of the proper rule of union liability. Whereas the central faction of the Court
appears determined to follow the established rule of Hztcleson-Alcn Bradley,
the two more extreme elements are seeldng to give new meaning to these deci-
sions. Mr. Justice Douglas, apparently feeling that unions have become so
powerful that they pose a grave threat to the competitive nature of the economy,
has suggested an approach which would severely restrict the right of a union to
exercise power, even in pursuit of heretofore legitimate objectives. On the other
hand, Mr. Justice Goldberg has enunciated a concept of extensive union freedom
from the antitrust laws, based on the idea that, since the unions and workers
have an essential interest in economic decisions and policies, formerly considered
to be matters of employer concern only, they should be able to attempt to control
these decisions and shape these policies.
The conflict is one which does not admit of resolution. There are strong
reasons of economic and social philosophy which would justify either the Gold-
berg or the Douglas approach, but the adoption of either would entail a basic
change in our national economic policy. The better approach would be for the
Court to await a definitive judgment of Congress. For the present, the Court
should follow the established rules of union liability in attempting to reconcile
those two confficting congressional policies: the one seeking to preserve a com-
petitive economy; the other to preserve the right of labor to organize to better
its condition.n s
NEW YORK'S MISTREATMENT OF BURDEN OF PROOF AND
THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST SUICIDE
I. INTPODUCTION
For nearly a decade,' the law in New York in an area of major concern to
insurance companies and their clients has been marked by confusion and
obfuscation.2 Many life insurance policies provide that the insurer will pay either
a sum certain3 or twice the face amount of the policy 4 if death is caused by
violent, external, and accidental means. As a condition precedent to the insurer's
11S. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
1. The controversial case of Begley v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America, I N.Y2d $30,
136 N.E.2d S39, 154 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1956), upended the established status of New- York law
regarding burden of proof and the presumption against suicide.
2. Peterfreund, E-tidence, 32 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1515, 1516-17 (1957). For a pointed illustra-
tion of the conflict among the authorities, see 30 N.Y. Jur. Insurance § 1090, at 473 (1963);
Richardson, Evidence § 60, at 40 (Prince 9th ed. 1964).
3. This type of policy is commonly called an accidental death policy.
4. This is known as a life insurance policy with a double indemnity provision. For the
purposes of this discussion, accidental death policies and life insurance policies with a double
indemnity proxision need not be distinguished, since the relevant language in the two con-
tracts is identical, and the conditions precedent which must be fulfilled to establh the in-
surer's liability are also the same.
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obligation to pay, however, it must be established that the insured's death was
indeed violent, external,5 and accidental. 6 The uncertainty that now besets the
law in New York is whether the burden is on the plaintiff-beneficiary to persuade
the jury that death was in fact accidental, or on the defendant-insurer to
prove suicide.7 The problem never arises under straight life insurance policies,
which exclude suicide from coverage as an excepted risk.8 In these cases, it is
well settled that the burden rests on the insurer to plead and prove suicide as
an affirmative defense.9
II. THE QUANDARY
A. Burden of Proof
Traditionally, the burden of proof as to the existence of a certain fact or the
truth of a particular proposition falls on the party who must allege the fact or
proposition in his pleadings.10 Moreover, this burden remains during the entire
trial on the party who initially assumed it and never shifts to the adverse party."
Consistent with this view, the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions outside
New York hold unequivocally that the burden of proof in actions to recover
accidental death or double indemnity benefits resides throughout the case with
the plaintiff. 12
The term burden of proof, however, has come to have two distinct meanings
which, unfortunately, have not always been observed in New York. The primary
5. The term "external" is meant to exclude from coverage any death influenced even In
part by some internal disorder or disease. What constitutes a violent or external death per se
is not under discussion. The problem of whether or not a death, apparently externally caused,
has been influenced by internal factors so as to preclude recovery for accidental death Is dis-
cussed in Howell, Burden of Proof: Accidental Death Insurance, 31 Ins. Counsel J. 223, 229
(1964).
6. The term "accidental" is meant to exclude from coverage any death caused by the
intentional act of the insured himself. It is well established, both in New York and in other
jurisdictions, that the term is also intended to preclude recovery for death caused by the
wilful act of another. See 29A Am. Jur. Insurance § 1192 (1960) and cases cited therein;
30 N.Y. Jur. Insurance § 1109 (1963) and cases cited therein.
7. In all the cases and authorities referred to in this discussion, the possibility that death
was caused by the intentional act of another has been eliminated. The only alternatives are
accident or suicide.
8. This distinction is crucial. The occasional failure of the courts to recognize it has been
a major cause of the confusion in New York law.
9. See 30 N.Y. Jur. Insurance § 1090, at 472-73 (1963); Richardson, Evidence § 60, at 40
(Prince 9th ed. 1964).
10. See 20 Am. Jur. Evidence § 135 (1939); 21 N.Y. Jur. Evidence § 148 (1961).
11. 20 Am. Jur. Evidence § 132 (1939); 21 N.Y. Jur. Evidence § 147 (1961).
12. See, e.g., Murray v. Travelers Ins. Co., 143 Colo. 258, 352 P.2d 678 (1960) (per
curiam); Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Nash, 97 So. 2d 4 (Fla. Ct. App. 1957) (per curiam); Hlnds
v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 155 Me. 349, 155 A.2d 721 (1959); Krantz v. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 335 Mass. 703, 141 N.E.2d 719 (1957); Carson v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 165 Ohio St. 238, 135 N.E.2d 259 (1956) ; Rodia v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,




or strict definition of the expression refers to the ultimate risk of non-persuasion
of the jury; i.e., the party upon whom the burden rests will lose if he has not
satisfied the jury of the truth of his cause by whatever quantum of proof is
demanded by the issue in question.13 Burden of proof in the secondary or loose
sense is actually the burden of going forward; i.e., the party upon whom the
burden rests, initially the plaintiff, must produce sufficient evidence to raise a
question of fact, or be subject to a directed verdict.14 However, fluctuating with
the state of the evidence, the burden of going forward may shift from one party
to another during the course of the trial.15 At least some part of the present con-
fusion in New York can be attributed to the failure of courts to indicate dearly
the sense in which the term burden of proof is being used.
B. The Presumption Against Suicide
Inseparable from any analysis of the allocation of the burden of proof where
the possibility of suicide is in issue is a consideration of the effect of the pre-
sumption against suicide upon the burden of proof.'0 The majority of jurisdic-
13. 20 Am. Jur. Evidence § 132 (1939); 21 N.Y. Jur. Evidence § 147 (1961).
14. 20 Am. Jur. Evidence § 132 (1939); 21 N.Y. Jur. Evidence § 147 (1961).
15. 20 Am. Jur. Evidence § 132 (1939); 21 N.Y. Jur. Evidence § 147 (1961).
16. In addition to or instead of the presumption against suicide, many jurisdictions recog-
nize the presumption in favor of accidental death. See Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 1264 (1950). It
has been observed that the two presumptions are not the came. Howell, supra note 5, at 224.
The presumption against suicide tends to exclude self-destruction as a cause of death, leaving
unaffected the possibility of other causes. Conversely, the presumption in favor of accidental
death urges the exclusion of all other causes except those that are accidental. However, where
the factual circumstances surrounding the death are such that accident or suicide are the only
possible causes, then the two presumptions have the same effect. In this discussion, any men-
tion of the presumption in favor of accidental death taken from the opinion in a case vill be
v.ithin the framework of the factual circumstances just described, and the two presumptions
can then be treated alike.
The nature and effect of presumptions generally has been the subject of voluminous
writing. Nothing said in this discussion should be construed as an attempt to finalize in pat
phrases the highly complex and fluid body of law that has evolved about the topic of presump-
tions. What is sought is merely to construct a conceptual frame of reference within which
the wandering course of the New York law can be traced.
Among the more highly recognized works on the subject are: McCormick, Evidence
§§ 306-22 (1954); Model Code of Evidence rule 704, at 305-13 (1942); Morgan, Foreword
to Model Code of Evidence 52-65 (1942); 9 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2499-540 (3d ed. 1940).
An excellent and more recent discussion of presumptions in violent death cases appears in
White, Presumptions in Violent Death Cases or Quo Vadis Presumption?, 15 U. Miami L.
Rev. 1 (1960). See also the authorities cited in McCormick, op. cit. supra at 635 n.1; White,
supra at 13.
Each of the following cases contains an excellent and extensive treatment of the presump-
tion and burden of proof. Beaver v. Fidelity Life Ass'n, 313 F.2d 111 (10th Cir. 1963);
O'Brien v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of United States, 212 F.2d 3S3 (8th Cir. 1954); New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Prejean, 149 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1945); Jefferson Standard Life Ins.
Co. v. Clemmer, 79 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1935); Hinds v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
155 Mle. 349, 155 A.2d 721 (1959) ; United States Nat'l Bank v. Underwriters at Lloyds, 396
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tions have formulated a settled rule regarding this effect. In the absence of
proof, the presumption assists the party in whose favor it operates to establish
a prima facie case and shifts the burden of going forward to his adversary. 17
Therefore, the presumption arises when the facts establish death by violent and
external means but leave unexplained whether death was suicidal or accidental. 18
Ordinarily, when substantial evidence 19 to the contrary is introduced, the pre-
sumption no longer operates. Thus, the jury is unaware of its ever having existed,
and the case is decided as though it never did exist.20 New York now seems to
be estranged from each of the foregoing principles.21
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW IN NEW YORK
A. The Early Decisions
The earliest reference by the New York Court of Appeals to the presumption
against suicide in a suit to recover accidental death benefits is found in Mallory
v. Travelers' Ins. Co.,22 decided in 1871. After reviewing the facts of the case,
the court found that "it appeared either that the death was caused by such an
injury [covered in the policy] or the suicidal act of the deceased; but the pre-
sumption is against the latter. It is contrary to the general conduct of man-
kind .... 23
The first significant treatment of the allocation of the burden by the court
P.2d 765 (Ore. 1964); cf. In the Matter of Estate of Wood, 374 Mich. 278, 132 N.W.2d 35
(1965).
17. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of United States, 212 F.2d 383 (8th
Cir. 1954) ; Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Clemmer, 79 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1935); United
Ins. Co. v. Nicholson, 119 A.2d 925 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1956); Ward v. Penn Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 352 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961); Combined Am. Ins. Co. v. Blanton, 163 Tex.
225, 353 S.W.2d 847 (1962). Even the earlier New York cases are in agreement. See, e.g.,
Steinmann v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 257 App. Div. 656, 657, 15 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52 (1st
Dep't 1939); Bolger v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America, 250 App. Div. 122, 123, 293 N.Y.
Supp. 554, 556 (2d Dep't 1937); Bass v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of United States, 19
N.Y.S.2d 736, 740 (N.Y. City Ct. 1940).
18. See, e.g., National Farmers Union Life Ins. Co. v. Norwood, 147 Colo. 283, 363 P.2d
681 (1961); World Ins. Co. v. Kincaid, 145 So. 2d 268 (Fla. Ct. App. 1962); Hood v, Life
& Cas. Ins. Co., 99 Ga. App. 403, 108 S.E.2d 884 (1959); Holloway v. Bankers Life Co., 248
Iowa 517, 81 N.W.2d 453 (1957); Carson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 165 Ohio St. 238,
135 N.E.2d 259 (1956); 20 Am. Jur. Evidence § 219 (1939); 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 135
(1964).
19. Cf. note 61 infra.
20. See, e.g., Cox v. Independent Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 101 Ga. App. 211, 113 S.E.2d 228
(1960); Ieppert v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 347 S.W.2d 436 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961);
Haith v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 171 Neb. 281, 106 N.W.2d 169 (1960); White, supra
note 16, at 3.
21. See 21 N.Y. Jur. Evidence § 122, at 257 (1961); Richardson, Evidence § 60, at 40
(Prince 9th ed. 1964).
22. 47 N.Y. 52 (1871). The action was brought to collect $2,000 on an accidental death
policy wherein the insurer promised to pay if the insured's death was caused by personal in-
juries sustained in any accident within the meaning of the policy.
23. Id. at 54-55.
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of appeals in claims for accidental death benefits appeared twenty-five years
later in Whitlatch v. Fidelity & Cas. Co.2 4 The defendant had submitted a
general denial and pleaded suicide as a separate defense. In spite of the special
plea,25 the court held that the burden of proof resided with the plaintiff-bene-
ficiary and that the defendant-insurer's allegation of suicide as a separate de-
fense did not gratuitously relieve the plaintiff of his burden to make out a prima
facie case'2,
The nature of the presumption against suicide was further defined in White
v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America.27 The presumption there was said to yield "to
evidence tending to show that death was self-inflicted .... "-4 The cautious
language used by the appellate division seemed to indicate that the presumption
could be overcome by a relatively small quantum of evidence to the contrary "-
24. 149 N.Y. 45, 43 N.E. 405 (1396), reversing 73 Hun 262, 23 N.Y. Supp. 951 (2d
Dep't 1894).
Before the decision in the Whitlatch case, the United States Supreme Court had expreszed
its views on the matter in Travelers' Ins. Co. v. McConkey, 127 U.S. 661 (1253). The trial
court had instructed the jury that, because suicide had bcen alleged in the answer as an
affirmative defense, the insurer must prove that allegation and overcome the presumption
against suicide by a preponderance of the evidence. The Supreme Court sustained the de-
fendant's objections to the charge and held that the plaintiff should bear the burden of
proving death from accidental means, but also that he was entitled to the benefit of the
presumption against suicide. Id. at 666-6S.
25. It is generally held that the party who carries the affirmative of an issue bears the
burden of proving the truth of his assertion. See authorities cited note 9 supra and accom-
panying text.
26. 149 N.Y. at 43, 43 N.E. at 406. This decision of the court of appeals seems to have
overruled by implication two earlier cases in which, under identical drcumstances, the burden
of proof was placed on the insurer. In Traphagen v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 10 N.Y. St. Rep. 716,
717 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 18S7), it had been held that "the burthen of proof was upon the
defendant to show that the insured came to his death from causes against which he was not
insured." In Guldenkirch v. United States Mlut. Ace. Ass'n, S N.Y. Supp. 42S, 430 (N.Y.
City Ct. 18S9), the burden of proof was placed on the plaintiff to show death from external,
violent, and accidental means, but the insurer had to prove that the condition in the policy
excluding injuries intentionally inflicted was met, because it was pleaded as an affirmative de-
fense.
In accord with Whitlatch is Larkin v. Inter-State Cas. Co., 43 App. Div. 365, LO N.Y. Supp.
205 (2d Dep't 1899).
27. 120 App. Div. 260, 105 N.Y. Supp. 37 (1st Dcp't 1907). Accord, Herschkowitz v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 93 Mlisc. 522, 157 N.Y. Supp. 436 (App. T. 1916). The White case was
an action to recover only the face amount of a life insurance policy. The presumption aainst
suicide is of much less significance in such a suit, since it has no effect on the allocation of the
burden of proof. However, the nature of the presumption is the same whether it appears in
connection with an action for double indemnity or accidental death benefits, or for only the
face amount of an ordinary life insurance policy. The court's .ieivs in White are, tberefore,
worth noting for their contribution to the developing body of law concerning the nature of
the presumption.
28. 120 App. Div. at 262, 105 N.Y. Supp. at 33-39. (Emphasis added.)
29. Compare text accompanying note S3 infra.
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B. The Maturity of the Presumption
The inevitable juxtaposition of the burden and the presumption in double
indemnity cases appeared in Weil v. Globe Indem. Co.30 Answering three crucial
questions on the application of the presumption, the court held: First, the burden
of proof on the whole case is upon the plaintiff to show that the death was acci-
dental; second, the effect of the presumption is to establish the plaintiff's prima
facie case; and, third, the jury should be carefully instructed that the presump-
tion becomes operative only as a substitute for unobtainable evidence where the
cause of death is otherwise unexplained. 3' For these reasons, the instruction of
the trial judge in Well, that facts which could support a finding of either accident
or suicide should be construed in favor of accident, was criticized by the appellate
court as tantamount to a charge that evidence evenly balanced is resolved in the
plaintiff's favor, patently and erroneously placing the burden on the defendant
to produce a preponderance of the evidence.32 The holding in Weil, consistent
30. 179 App. Div. 166, 166 N.Y. Supp. 225 (1st Dep't 1917).
31. Id. at 167-69, 166 N.Y. Supp. at 226-27.
32. The significance of the decision and the clarity of the court's reasoning warrant setting
forth the opinion in some detail:
"The plaintiff's case was duly established prima fade, supported by the well-established
presumption that where the cause of death was either accident or suicide, and there is no
evidence explaining the cause, the law presumes that the death was accidental. The defendant
pleaded and undertook to establish as an affirmative defense that the deceased [committed
suicide] ....
"[Tihe rule is . . . that the burden of proof that the death was accidental is upon the
plaintiff, on the whole case....
"The learned trial justice, however, nullified his charge that the burden of proof on the
whole case was with the plaintiff by twice pointedly instructing the jury in connection with
the burden of proof that 'If the facts are equally susceptible of either construction-that Is,
suicide on the one hand, accident upon the other it will be presumed that the death was the
result of an accident and not of a wrongful intent.' This was tantamount to instructing the
jury that if the evidence was evenly balanced the law resolved it in favor of the plaintiff.
This squarely put upon the defendant the burden of producing a preponderance of evidence
and was directly contrary to the charge that the burden of proof on the whole case was on
the plaintiff. As was said in Whitlatch v. Fidelity & Casualty Co .... where the issue is so
close it is extremely important to have the rules as to the burden of proof correctly given
to the jury. These contrary instructions were confusing to say the least and could only have
been understood by the jury as meaning that if upon all the evidence they were in doubt
or if the scales hung evenly balanced, the law presumed the issue in favor of the plaintiff.
The court would have been entirely correct in telling the jury that the presumption of law
is against suicide and that in weighing the evidence they should give due weight to this
presumption, but a charge that, where the facts are equally susceptible of either construction,
the presumption is that death was the result of an accident is only appropriate in cases
where the cause of death is unexplained .... The court confused this rule of presumption,
which is available only for the purpose of taking the place of unobtainable evidence, with
the burden of proof." Id. at 167-69, 166 N.Y. Supp. at 226-28. (Italics omitted.) (Citation
omitted.) Accord, Hodgson v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co., 100 Misc. 155, 161, 165 N.Y. Supp.
293, 297 (Sup. Ct. 1917), aff'd, 182 App. Div. 381, 169 N.Y. Supp. 28 (2d Dep't 1918), rev'd
mem. on other grounds, 188 App. Div. 981, 176 N.Y. Supp. 903 (2d Dep't 1919).
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with the mainstream of judicial opinion, 33 has never been e.xpressly overruled,
but later cases apparently have done so by implication if they are given a literal
interpretation.34
C. Some Enigmatic Opinions
For nearly twenty years following the Well decision, the question of the re-
lationship between the presumption against suicide and the burden of proof,
when it did arise in actions to recover accidental death benefits, remained
virtually unchanged.35 Then, in 1936, in Fink v. New York Life Ins. Co.'- an
obscure case in the City Court of New York, the court, through a misreading of
an earlier court of appeals case, Martorella v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amcrica37
arrived at a conclusion which was totally at variance with earlier law and which
may have accidentally influenced the course of the law at that time. After con-
ceding that "the burden of proof rests with the plaintiff to show that the cause
of death was accidental, '"s the court nevertheless declared that
the proposition that the defense of suicide must be pleaded and proved by the defen-
dant has been upheld in Martorella v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America. In that
33. See cases cited note 12 supra.
34. See Richardson, Evidence § 60, at 40 (Prince 9th ed. 1964).
35. In 1932, the case of Mlandi v. 'Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 143 Misc. 771, 257 N.11.
Supp. 71 (Munic. Ct. N.Y. 1932), appeared in the First District of Queens. Fortunately, the
case was isolated and had no influence on New York law. It may be interesting to point out,
however, some of the legal inconsistencies in Mandi, perhaps as a portent of things to come.
The plaintiff sought to recover under a double indemnity provision of a life insurance policy.
After stating the facts, the court defined the issue in the case: "We are to determine whether
the death was accidental, or whether Mandi committed suicide, sane or insane. Each of the
parties has his own burden, under the pleadings. If there be no affirmative evidence either
way, there must be judgment for the plaintiff." Id. at 772, 257 N.Y. Supp. at 73. Thus, at the
outset, citing no authority, the court placed the burden of proof on the defendant. After
correctly stating the conditions under which the presumption against suicide oparates, the
court continued: "The presumption going to the aid of plaintiff's prima fade case, it was thus
established that the drowning was accidental. The burden then shifted to defendant to shov,,,
under its answer, that death was caused by self-destruction." Id. at 773, 257 N.Y. Supp. at
74. No indication is offered whether "burden" is meant in its primary or in its secondary
sense. See text accompanying notes 13-15 supra.
The most blatant distortions of the law were yet to come. After reviewing the evidence, the
court concluded: "[T]he rule is that the evidence must be such as to leave no other rea-
sonable hypothesis than that of suicide, or, in other words, that the facts must exclude every
reasonable hypothesis of natural or accidental death .... It is also held that the prezumption
against suicide is strong and may not be overthrown, except by evidence that is dear, cogent,
and convincing." 143 ifsc. at 774, 257 N.Y. Supp. at 75. (Citations omitted.) The court vs
actually saying that the defendant-insurer, in order to overcome the presumption against
suicide, must prove suicide beyond a reasonable doubt.
36. 158 Misc. 441, 2M5 N.Y. Supp. 440 (N.Y. City Ct. 1936).
37. 26S N.Y. 586, 193 N.E. 417 (1935).
38. 15S Misc. at 442, 235 N.Y. Supp. at 442. The court cited the Whitatch decidson for
this proposition, but then neglected to mention that in Whitlatch it was also said that the
presumption against suicide does not shift this burden. See note 26 supra and accompanying
text.
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case the appellate court affirmed a judgment for plaintiff when the trial judge charged
that the burden of proof on the issue of suicide was upon the defendant .. .
The error committed by the court in Fink was in not realizing that there had
been two separate trials of the Martorella case. At the first trial, a typical double
indemnity suit, the judge refused to instruct the jury that the burden of proof
to show that death was accidental was on the plaintiff. The appellate division
ruled that the failure of the trial judge to deliver the requested charge was re-
versible error and ordered a new trial.40 As the second trial was about to begin,
the plaintiff's attorney informed the court that his client would waive her cause
of action with respect to the accidental death benefits and proceed only upon
the cause of action to recover the face amount of the policy.41 Since this was no
longer an action for double indemnity, the judge's charge that the burden of
proof with respect to this issue was on the defendant 42 was unquestionably
correct.
43
The unfortunate decision in Fink was followed one year later by Bolger v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of America.44 Adding more confusion to the situation, the
court in Bolger declared: "The plaintiff's prima facie case was aided by the
inference of accident arising from the conceded death by violent and external
means, which inference arises as a consequence of the presumption against
suicide. 45 The term inference of accident owes its origin to the Bolger court.
Among the authorities cited for the proposition were the opinions of the courts
in Mallory, White, and Weil. Nowhere in any of those opinions was there
mention of an inference of accident arising from the presumption against suicide.
The Bolger court continued:
The plaintiff's case being prima facie sufficient, the duty rested upon the defendant to
go forward with evidence of circumstances surrounding the death from which the
defendant wished to have drawn the inference of suicide ... even though the burden
upon the whole case rested upon the plaintiff to establish that the death was due to
violent, external and accidental means. 46
Although this statement of the law is in accord with the majority of jurisdic-
tions 47 and with the principles enunciated in Weil,48 it was derived from sources
39. 158 Misc. at 443, 285 N.Y. Supp. at 442-43.
40. Martorella v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 238 App. Div. 532, 264 N.Y. Supp. 751
(4th Dep't 1933).
41. Record, p. 16, Martorella v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 268 N.Y. 586, 198 N.E.
417 (1935). The fact that this was an action to recover only the face amount of the policy
is announced in the first sentence of the opinion delivered by the court of appeals.
42. Martorella v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 268 N.Y. 586, 587, 198 N.E. 417
(1935).
43. See authorities cited note 9 supra and accompanying text. The jury returned a verdict
for the plaintiff, and judgment was entered on the verdict. The appellate division affirmed
the judgment. 241 App. Div. 910, 271 N.Y. Supp. 1042 (4th Dep't 1934) (memorandum de-
cision). The court of appeals also affirmed. 268 N.Y. 586, 198 N.E. 417 (1935).
44. 250 App. Div. 122, 293 N.Y. Supp. 554 (2d Dep't 1937) (per curiam).
45. Id.'at 123, 293 N.Y. Supp. at 555.
46. Id. at 123, 293 N.Y. Supp. at 556. (Emphasis added.) (Citations omitted.)
47. See cases cited note 12 supra.
48. See note 32 supra.
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which do not support it. Cited for the proposition were Traphagcn v. Fidelity &
Cas. Co.,4 9 Martorella, and Fink. Each of these cases spoke of the burden of
proof as abiding with the defendant; none mentioned the burden of going for-
ward. Furthermore, as discussed previously, Traphagcn, decided in 1837, was
overruled by implication by the Whitlatch decision;ao Martorella, an action in-
volving only a straight life policy, is no authority for any proposition regarding
burden of proof in actions for accidental death benefits;al and Fink relied ex-
clusively on Martorella. The anomalous result is a sound legal principle deduced
from sources that are worthless as authority and which, in addition, do not stand
for the principle for which they were cited.1P2
D. The Achievement of Judicial Concord
The dubious manner in which the Bolger court developed the principles which
it proclaimed might have weakened the persuasiveness of the holding itself if
it had not been reaffirmed in a succession of thoughtful opinions.03 The perplex-
49. 10 N.Y. SL Rep. 716 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1MS7). See note 26 supra.
50. See note 26 supra.
51. See tert accompanying notes 40-43 supra.
52. Before the conclusion of this section concerning the illogic of certain decisions involv-
ig burden of proof and the presumption against suicide, two other cases should be men-
tioned. In Ostrander v. Travelers Ins. Co., 265 N.Y. 467, 193 N.E. 274, affirming mem. 241
App. Div. S03, 270 N.Y. Supp. 923 (1934) (memorandum decion), the jury had returned
a verdict for the defendant and judgment was entered accordingly. The judgment was
affirmed by both the appellate division and the court of appeals; neither court wrote an
opinion. In its brief statement of the facts, the court of appeals observed that "the trial judge
charged that the burden of proof was upon the plaintiff to show that the death vs caused
entirely by accidental means, and upon the defendant to show that the insured committed
suicide." Ibid. No indication was given whether the court intended to convey approval or
disapproval of that instruction. It is the only such jury charge found to have been given by
a New York judge, although similar language can be found in the law of other jurisdictions.
Because of another instance of imprecision in reading and citing prior decisions, the state-
ment quoted above, taken from the court's outline of the facts in 03trander, appeared in a
later case as a principle of law laid down by the court of appeals: "The burden was upon
plaintiff to show that the death of the insured was caused entirely by accidental means, and
upon the defendant to show that the insured committed suicide. (Ostrander v. Travelsr Ins.
Co., 265 N.Y. 467.)" Shtevelan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 162 Misc. 335, 36, 295 N.Y.
Supp. 735, 7.37 (N.Y. City Ct. 1937), aff'd mem., 254 App. Div. 729, 5 N.YS.2d 767 (1st
Dep't 1933). (Italics omitted.) Neither Ostrander nor Shtevelan has since appeared as au-
thority for this proposition.
53. Cramer v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 261 App. Div. 101s, 26 N.Y.S.2d 15 (3d Dcp't
1941) (per curiam); Steinmann v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 257 App. Div. 656, 15 N.Y.S2d
51 (1st Dep't 1939); Weidy v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America, 256 App. Div. 773, 11
N.Y.S.2d 722 (1st Dep't 1939); Jahn v. Commercial Travelers lut. Acc. Ass'n of America,
256 App. Div. 835, 9 N.Y.S.2d 257 (2d Dep't 1939); Davis v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y
of United States, 114 N.Y.S.2d 314 (Sup. CL 1952); Suslensky v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
40 N.Y.S.2d 59 (N.Y. City CL), rev'd on other grounds, iSO Misc. 624, 43 N.Y.S.2d 144
(App. T. 1943), aff'd mem., 267 App. Div. 312, 46 N.Y.S.2d 033 (1st Dep't 1944), motion for
leave to appeal denied, 270 App. Div. 319, 60 N.Y.S.2d 294 (2d Dcp't 1946); Bas- v. Equi-
table Life Assur. Soc'y of United States, 19 N.YS.2d 736 (N.Y. City CL 1940); Magnoli v.
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 192 Misc. 344, 73 N.Y.S.2d 130 (Munic. CL N.Y. 1943);
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ing phrase inference of accident, said to arise as a consequence of the presump-
tion against suicide, recurred in another opinion,5 4 with no more meaning or
explanation accompanying it than when it first appeared.", Aside from this slight
discordant note, however, following Weil, the cases reveal a harmonious treatment
of the allocation of the burden of proof and the nature and effect of the pre-
sumption against suicide.5 6
The uniformly accepted proposition that the burden of proof as to accidental
death falls on the plaintiff-beneficiary and remains there throughout the case
was summarized, in Steinmann v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,"7 as follows: "The
burden of proof at all times rested on the plaintiff to establish that the death of
[the insured] ...was the result of accident and, accordingly, that it was not
the result of suicide." 58 This orthodox principle was more comprehensively ex-
pressed in Jahn v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Ass'n of America:50
[O]n the whole case, the burden of proof to establish that the death was due to
accidental means was upon the plaintiff. The jury should have been charged that in
weighing the evidence, if upon the whole case the evidence which it credited was
evenly balanced on the issue of accidental death or suicidal death, the verdict must be
for the defendant; that only in the event the evidence preponderated in support of
a finding of accidental death should the verdict be for the plaintiff. 60
Furthermore, the position taken by the courts at this time regarding the
function of the presumption against suicide and the conditions under which it
became operative was likewise unambiguous. The presumption arose only in the
absence of affirmative evidence of the cause of death. 1 Once in existence, its
cf. Shalita v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 266 App. Div. 131, 41 N.Y.S.2d 507 (3d Dep't
1943); Berkowitz v. New York Life Ins. Co., 256 App. Div. 324, 10 N.Y.S.2d 106 (1st Dep't
1939).
54. Bass v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of United States, 19 N.Y.S.2d 736, 740 (N.Y. City
Ct. 1940).
55. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
56. The only case containing a statement concerning instructions to the jury is Jahn v.
Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Ass'n of America, 256 App. Div. 835, 9 N.Y.S.2d 257 (2d
Dep't 1939). The court said that the jury should have been charged that, under the facts of
the case, "the presumption of law against suicide could be invoked by the plaintiff to estab-
lish that the death was 'accidental.' They, however, should also have been charged that when
the defendant adduced proof which indicated that the decedent's death was due to suicide,
the jury should then, from all the evidence which it credited, decide without regard to any
presumption . .. ." Id. at 836, 9 N.Y.S.2d at 258.
57. 257 App. Div. 656, 15 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1st Dep't 1939).
58. Id. at 657, 15 N.Y.S.2d at 52.
59. 256 App. Div. 835, 9 N.Y.S.2d 257 (2d Dep't 1939).
60. Id. at 836, 9 N.Y.S.2d at 259. The latest opinion in this particular group of cases
unequivocally stated that "it is well established that in a case of this kind, where one seeks
to recover an accidental death benefit under an insurance policy, the burden of proof to estab-
lish death within the terms and conditions of the coverage rests upon the plaintiff .... " Davis
v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of United States, 114 N.Y.S.2d 814, 815 (Sup. Ct. 1952). (Cita-
tions omitted.)
61. "That presumption [against suicide] is only available when there is no evidence
adduced by the defendant from which it may be inferred that the death was suicidal. When
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function was to help establish the plaintiff's prima facie case and to shift the
burden of going forward to the defendant. 2 Significantly, throughout these cases
the presumption was considered rebuttable and could be overcome by the
defendant's adducing sufficient evidence of suicide. 63 The rule was perhaps best
expressed in Steinmann:
In submitting the case to the jury the court charged that the presumption against
suicide remained to be considered by the jury. We think the charge presents error
.... That presumption disappeared ... when the defendant had produced evidence
sufficient to rebut it.64
In Bass v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of United States,5 the court succinctly
held that the plaintiff was "aided by this presumption to the extent of establishing
his prima fade case. But this presumption disappears when the defendant has
adduced sufficient evidence to rebut it." 6 Every decision in this line of cases
testified directly or by implication to the transitory nature of the presumption
against suicide, appearing and vanishing according to the state of the affirmative
evidence. It did not seem likely that these firmly established doctrines would be
easily or quickly controverted.
E. The Disintegration
Then, in 1956, the New York Court of Appeals decided Begley v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of America, 7 which, if literally interpreted, upends the established law
regarding both burden of proof and the presumption against suicide in actions
such evidence is adduced the presumption may not be given v.eight as evidence.... In other
words, with respect to the presumption against suicide, a distinction is to be made between
its availability where the defendant rests upon the plaintiff's proof, and those cases where
the defendant adduces substantial evidence which, it contends, establishes that the death %vas
due to suicide." Jahn v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Assn of America, 256 App. Div.
335-36, 9 N.Y.S.2d 257, 253-59 (2d Dep't 1939). (Citations omitted.) This language is
reminiscent of that found in the Weil case. See note 32 supra.
62. "The plaintiff was assisted in establishing a prima fade case by the presumption
against suicide which served to shift to the defendant the necessity of proceeding with coun-
tervailing proof." Steinmann v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 257 App. Div. 656, 657, 15
N.Y.S.2d 51, 52 (1st Dep't 1939) (Italics omitted.). Accord, Weidy v. Prudential Ins. Co.
of America, 256 App. Div. 773, 7S0, 11 N.YS.2d 722, 724 (1st Dep't 1939).
63. The courts in New York as well as in other jurisdictions have been reluctant to com-
ment on what constitutes evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption. See generally 20
Am. Jur. Evidence § 220 (1939); 21 N.Y. Jur. Evidence § 93 (1961).
64. 257 App. Div. at 657, 15 N.Y.S.2d at 52.
65. 19 N.Y.S.2d 736 (N.Y. City Ct. 1940).
66. Id. at 740.
67. 1 N.Y.2d 530, 136 N.E.2d 339, 154 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1956), reversing 235 App. Div. 961,
138 N.Y.S2d 851 (2d Dep't 1955). The case was tried a second time with the result that the
jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant and dismissed the complaint. The plaintiff
appealed. The appellate division, in 6 App. Div. 2d 369, 177 N.Y.S.2d 577 (2d Dep't 1953)
(per curiam), reversed the judgment on the grounds that the finding implicit in the verdict
was contrary to the weight of the credible evidence and that certain expert testimony should
not have been admitted. Nothing was said that changed the meaning or the impact of the
court of appeals' opinion.
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to recover accidental death benefits. On the trial of the case, the supreme court
entered judgment on the verdict for the plaintiff-beneficiary, and the insurer
appealed. The appellate division reversed, partly on the ground 8 that
in view of the evidence adduced by defendant which was of circumstances wholly
inconsistent with a finding of accidental death and the failure of plaintiff to adduce
any evidence to the contrary, the presumption is of no avail and plaintiff has failed
to overcome the burden of establishing that the death was by accidental means.00
Specifically rejecting the contention that the presumption was "of no avail" to
the plaintiff, the court of appeals, in reversing the appellate division, pointedly
declared:
When death has resulted from violence, the presumption against suicide does more
than shift the burden of proof and upon having done so disappears from the case;
it continues to the end of the case and if a fair question of fact is presented as to
whether death was due to suicide or accident, then the jury should answer accident. 70
This decision was the consequence of a radically new interpretation of the nature
and function of the presumption against suicide. As authority for its position,
the Begley court relied solely on Wellisch v. John Hancock Milt. Life Ins. Co.71
In fact, it had no alternate choice, since other prior decisions on the matter in
New York are directly to the contrary. 72
68. The court also questioned whether or not the beneficiary had satisfied the condition
precedent of furnishing due proof of accidental death according to the provision of the policy.
285 App. Div. at 961-62, 138 N.Y.S.2d at 852-53.
69. Id. at 962, 138 N.Y.S.2d at 853. The appellate division found the facts to be as fol-
lows: "The evidence was that the insured, a male of about twenty-nine years of age, was a
bed patient in a second floor room of a veterans hospital on the day of his death; that lie
suffered from rheumatic heart disease; that he had spent various periods in hospitals during
the year and a half up to the time of his death; that he had been mentally depressed within
the weeks immediately previous to his death; that his body was found on the ground
beneath the window of the room; that both sashes of the window were found to be drawn
up into the upper half of the window, that the lower half was covered with bronze screening
mounted upon a wooden frame which was attached to the window frame, and that the
screening was broken to the extent that its lower portion, which was variously stated to
measure from the bottom of the window sill three feet up to the center of the screening, or
one fourth or one third of the height of the screen, flapped outwardly; and a physicist
testified that, in his opinion, the assured's body had horizontal velocity when it left the
window, on the basis, among other things, of the distance between the body on the ground
and the base of the building, and the height of the window above the ground." Ibid. Tile
court of appeals remarked that the proof offered by the defendant regarding decedent's
mental depression in the weeks preceding his death was "sharply controverted" by the plain-
tiff, and also noted that the testimony of the physicist regarding the decedent's horizontal
velocity as he left the window was unaccompanied by any proof that the body actually
landed in the same spot at which it was found. 1 N.Y.2d at 533, 136 N.E.2d at 841, 154
N.Y.S.2d at 868.
70. Ibid.
71. 293 N.Y. 178, 56 N.E.2d 540 (1944).
72. See pp. 313-15 supra. One qualification should be made. The writer is speaking of the




An analysis of Wellisch, being essential to an understanding of Begley, one
vital distinction must be drawn at the outset. The plaintiff in Tlrellisch brought
suit to recover only the face amount of a life insurance policy; there was no
claim for double indemnity or accidental death benefits. In such an action, the
burden of proof is on the defendant throughout the case to prove suicide as an
affirmative defense.73 Nevertheless, the court in WVellisch declared that the pre-
sumption against suicide is not "the sort of 'presumption' that serves only to
shift the burden of proof and disappears from the case as soon as evidence to
the contrary is offered." 7 4
The term burden of proof, in this context, must have been intended to mean
burden of going forward, i.e., burden of proof in its secondary sense.Y5 There are
two compelling reasons for this interpretation. First, the principle that the pre-
sumption against suicide shifts the ultimate burden of proof had been unani-
mously rejected by all prior New York decisions," as well as by courts in other
jurisdictions.77 Secondly, the burden of proof on the issue of suicide in Wcllisch,
as in any action to collect on a straight life policy, was on the defendant from
the very outset.78 It would be strange indeed for the court to speak of a pre-
sumption as allocating the burden of proof to the party upon whom it dearly
rested before the presumption ever arose. As has already been pointed out, the
burden of going forward with the evidence can shift as the trial progresses and
is not on the same party at all times. The latter, therefore, is the only burden
that logically can be said to shift to the defendant under a set of facts such as
is found in Wellisch. If the court in Begley were speaking of burden of proof in
its primary sense in reliance on the views expressed in Wedlisch, then the reliance
was misplaced. If, on the other hand, Begley, like l1dllisch, referred, in fact, to
the secondary meaning of burden of proof, then Begley would not have changed
the New York law on this point.
Unfortunately, Begley again misinterpreted Wclisch, in holding that the pre-
sumption against suicide "continues to the end of the case."' 3O As Wellisch in fact
pointed out, the
presumption is not one of those that takes the place of evidence so as to create a
question of fact even when all the real proof is the other way.... The "presumption
against suicide" means that when death by violence is shown and an inference must
be drawn by the jury as to suicide or not, then the jury should in justice and good
conscience draw the inference of accident, not suicide. 0
The Wellisclh court was merely saying that, where the presumption has been
rebutted, a jury may still take notice of man's normal reluctance to destroy his
73. 30 N.Y. Jur. Insurance § 1090, at 473 (1963); Richardson, Evidence § CO, at 40
(Prince 9th ed. 1964).
74. 293 N.Y. at 184, 56 N.E.2d at 543.
75. See text accompanying notes 14 & 15 supra.
76. See pp. 308-15 supra.
77. See cases cited note 12 supra and accompanying text.
78. See text accompanying notes 70 & 71 supra.
79. 1 N.Y.2d at 533, 136 N.E.2d at 841, 154 N.Y.S.2d at S63. This language would have
to be interpreted as meaning that the presumption against suicide is irrebuttable.
SO. 293 N.Y. at 184, 56 N.E.2d at 543. (Citations omitted.)
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own life and draw an inference of accident in reaching a decision. Where the
facts could support an inference of either suicide or accident, i.e., where the
evidence was in a state of equipoise, it was perfectly proper for the Wellisch
court to hold that the jury should find the latter, for, since only a straight life
policy was involved, the defendant had failed to meet his burden of proof to
establish suicide. It was, however, grossly improper for the Begley court to hold,
in reliance on Wellisch, that with the evidence in a state of equipoise the jury
should likewise find accident, since the plaintiff in Begley had failed to meet his
burden of proof to establish accident. By ignoring this crucial distinction, the
court of appeals effectively placed the onus of the burden of proof on the insur-
ance company in every action to collect the proceeds of a life insurance policy.
F. The Aftermath
The impact of Begley is seen not so much in subsequent case law as in the
virtual absence of litigation on the issue of accidental death versus suicide.81
One commentator has observed that "insurers have long been aware that the
cards are stacked against them when it comes to the jury trial" and that it now
seems "practically impossible for the insurer in a double indemnity case to
prove a suicide death except through the evidence supplied by an eye witness
or by an authenticated suicide note."8 2 This pessimism is substantiated by the
holding in Nathan v. New York Life Ins. Co.33 An unprejudiced view of the
evidence84 could have led to the conclusion that the insured committed suicide.
81. Only three cases in the New York courts have been reported since the Begley decision
in 1956. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co. of America, 18
App. Div. 2d 772, 235 N.Y.S.2d 83 (4th Dep't 1962) (per curiam); Barsky v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 23 Misc. 2d 921, 200 N.Y.S.2d 495 (App. T.) (per curiam), aff'd mem., 12 App.
Div. 2d 449, 209 N.Y.S.2d 264 (1st Dep't); Nathan v. New York Life Ins. Co., 8 Misc.
2d 5, 159 N.Y.S.2d 862 (Sup. Ct. 1957). There have been recent observations regarding the
presumption against suicide in actions not for accidental death or double indemnity benefits
but based on very similar claims. Cf. Ackerman v. Dairymen's League Co-op. Ass'n, 10 App.
Div. 2d 112, 197 N.Y.S.2d 674 (3d Dep't 1960), motion for leave to appeal denied, 8 N.Y.2d
706, 168 N.E.2d 395, 202 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1960) (action for death benefits under Workmen's
Compensation Law with defense of statutory presumption against suicide); Ferrainolo v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 197 N.Y.S.2d 36 (Sup. Ct.), modified mem., 12 App. Dlv. 2d
720, 208 N.Y.S.2d 136 (4th Dep't 1960), rev'd memn. on other grounds, 15 App. Div. 2d 718,
223 N.Y.S.2d 261 (4th Dep't 1962), judgment and order aff'd mein., 19 App. Div. 2d 697,
242 N.Y.S.2d 634 (4th Dep't 1963) (defendant's motion for summary judgment In action to
recover double indemnity benefits); Stawski v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 7 Misc. 2d
424, 163 N.Y.S.2d 155 (Sup. Ct. 1957) (action to recover accidental death benefits with
defense that insured's death was caused in a manner excluded from coverage).
The Ackerman case raises the question of the possible effect of Begley on the presumptions
against suicide created by statute in New York. Two such statutes are involved. In a claim
for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Law, the death of the employee will
be presumed not to be the result of suicide. N.Y. Workmen's Comp. Law § 21(3). A similar
provision has been made with respect to the death of a volunteer fireman. N.Y. Vol. Fire-
men's Benefit Law § 44.
82. Fagan, Insurance, 32 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1409, 1410 (1957).
83. 8 Misc. 2d 5, 159 N.Y.S.2d 862 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
84. The decedent was a cardiac patient, 68 years old, very feeble and seriously Ill, and
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However, the court found otherwise, conceding in its own words the influence
of Begley: "Judge Dye in the recent case of Begley v. Prudential Ins. Co....
further strengthened the presumption against suicide as follows .. . 'If a fair
question of fact is presented as to whether death was due to suicide or accident,
then the jury should answer accident.' "'* It was further held in NVathan that the
presumption "is a true presumption,86 firmly established... which places the
onus upon the defendant to destroy it (Martorella v. Prudential Ins. Co .... )st
since it remains throughout the case (Begley.. .) ."
The Nathan opinion is the only instance of direct influence"a exerted by Begley
in the sparse litigation which has followed that decision. It seems fitting to note
that in the most recent treatment of double indemnity, the appellate division, in
admittedly in his last days. Oxygen and sedatives were being administered continually on
the morning of his death. His body was found on the pavement adjoining the hospital,
directly beneath the window of his room nine stories above. The evidence was contradictory
whether, immediately before the occurrence, the window was open or closed, the ventilator
removed or in place, and the bed rails up or down. The undisputed fact was that there
was a radiator directly under the window sill and that the distance across the radiator to
the outside wall of the building was approximately 274 feet. The trial judge conceded
(the case was tried without a jury) that, even -iewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, "the fact remains that his physical stature and the aspects and
dimensions of the window structure are such as to make it unlikely that he toppled vithout
some prior effort and intent to place himself in that precarious position, unless he did so in
his sleep, while in a stupor or otherwise helpless." Id. at 6, 159 N.Y.S2d at 864. Having
admitted that the decedent must have voluntarily gone out on the window sill, the court
then decided that an intent to commit suicide was the less probable reason for his having
gone there. It seems, on the contrary, that such an intent would be the more plausible
hypothesis.
85. Id. at 6, 159 N.Y.S.2d at S63, quoting from Begley v. Prudential Ins. Co., 1 N.Y2d
530, 533, 136 N.E.2d 839, 341, 154 N.Y.S.2d S66, S6 (1956). (Citation omitted.)
S6. See text accompanying note 93 infra.
37. Note that once again the Mlartorella case has been misread. See text accompanying
notes 40-43 supra.
S8. 3 MIsc. 2d at 7, 159 N.Y.S.2d at 864. (Citations omitted.) (Footnotes added.)
S9. In Barsky v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 23 Misc. 2d 921, 922, 20D N.Y.S2d 495,
496 (App. T.) (per curiam), aff'd mem., 12 App. Div. 2d 449, 209 N.YS.2d 264 (Ist Dep't
1960), the court ruled that there was "no support for a judgment in favor of plaintiff
based upon accidental death." In the dissenting opinion, however, it was thought that
"the defendant failed to establish by a fair preponderance of the evidence that insured's
death was the result of suicide." Ibid.
A recent example of highly questionable scholar-hip which can throw the law in any
area into turmoil appears in Ferrainolo v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 197 N.YMS2d 36
(Sup. Ct.), modified mem., 12 App. Div. 2d 720, 208 N.Y.S.2d 136 (4th Dep't 1960), rev'd
mem. on other grounds, 15 App. Div. 2d 713, 223 N.Y.S.2d 261 (4th Dep't 1962), judgment
and order aff'd mem., 19 App. Div. 2d 697, 242 N.Y.S.2d 634 (4th Dep't 1963). The court
held: "Defendant has pleaded that the insured committed suicide and that hence defendant
isn't liable to the plaintiff under the policy. Defendant has the burden of proof on this issue."
Id. at 39. To support this misstatement of the lax, the court relied on three decisions of
the court of appeals-in 1S36, 1394, and I96-none of which concerned the question of
accidental death. Id. at 39-40.
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Merchants Natl Bank & Trust Co. v. State Mut. Life Ins. Co. of America,00
held that the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to establish that death was
accidental.91 The court cited no authority for its holding; the Begley decision
was nowhere mentioned in the brief opinion.
IV. CONCLUSION
New York has accorded the presumption against suicide a treatment that can
only be described as reverent. Viewed alongside the impressive unanimity of
decisions in other jurisdictions and pre-Begley New York courts, and in light
of the estimable opinions of scholars who have commented on this matter, New
York's present position can be justified neither by tradition nor by logic, and is
primarily responsible for the confounded state of the law regarding the allocation
of the burden of proof where suicide is the fact in issue.
Admittedly, it is difficult to indicate with precision the quantum of evidence
sufficient to overcome the presumption. Decisions of various courts reflect the
complexities involved and the absence of a consensus on this point. 2 It is
generally recognized, nevertheless, that a true presumption arises as a matter
of law from a particular state of facts, but disappears when substantial evidence
to the contrary is introduced.93 No other jurisdiction has gone as far as New
York in holding that the presumption never disappears from the case"4 and is,
in effect, irrebuttable. The singular and unmistakable effect of New York's atti-
tude is to place the burden of proof on the party against whom the presumption
operates.9 5 If in New York, as in virtually every other jurisdiction, the burden
of proof is to remain on the plaintiff-beneficiary to establish accidental death,
while at the same time the presumption against suicide continues to receive its
unique interpretation, an intelligible jury charge is impossible. It is submitted,
therefore, that New York should reinstate the rules espoused in Well as con-
sonant with sound reason and established tradition.
90. 18 App. Div. 2d 772, 235 N.Y.S.2d 83 (4th Dep't 1962) (per curiam).
91. Id. at 772, 235 N.Y.S.2d at 84.
92. Howell, Burden of Proof: Accidental Death Insurance, 31 Ins. Counsel J. 223, 225
(1964).
93. Richardson, Evidence § 57 (Prince 9th ed. 1964).
94. Id. § 55.
95. In civil actions, this particular category of presumption in New York had pre-
viously been limited, probably for reasons of public policy, to presumptions of legitimacy
and marriage. Id. § 57, at 36.
